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Reducing the U.S.-Japan Trade Deficit by
Eliminating Japanese Barriers to Foreign
Direct Investment
Charles 0. Roehrdanz
Foreign direct investment plays an integral role in world
trade. Assets held by a domestic company in a foreign country
constitute foreign direct investment.1 Such investment expands
trade because foreign subsidiaries typically buy goods and sup-
plies from their parent companies in their home countries. This
intracompany trade accounts for thirty to forty percent of world
trade in manufactured goods. 2 Intracompany trade is primarily
responsible for the $62 billion U.S. trade deficit with Japan in
1994.3
Foreign direct investment levels in Japan are extremely
low. In the first ten months of 1994, foreign direct investment in
Japan totalled $2.975 billion while Japanese direct investment
throughout the world reached $32.604 billion.4 In 1993, U.S.
1. Peter Behr, For Dinosaurs, Multinationals Are Looking Pretty Healthy,
WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1994, at B11. For example, "when Sara Lee Corp. buys a
clothing plant in Honduras, or AT&T establishes a research venture in China,
or Mercedes-Benz builds a car plant in Alabama, that is foreign direct invest-
ment." Id. at B13. Foreign direct investment "covers direct spending on busi-
ness operations, like acquisitions, plant construction and investments in other
operations. Such spending is distinguished from portfolio investments, like
buying securities or other such financial transactions." James Sterngold, Ris-
ing Yen Might Widen This Gap, N.Y. TMES, July 7, 1993, at D1.
2. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 168 (1994).
3. U.S. May Meet Japanese Auto Makers; Renewed Car Talks Set For Feb.
15-17, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Feb. 9, 1995). "By 1980, Japanese subsidiaries
in America-nearly all operating as wholesalers-distributed over three-
quarters of all U.S. imports from Japan." DENNIS J. ENCARNATION, RIVALS BE-
YOND TRADE: AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN IN GLOBAL COMPETITON 119 (1992). In
1980, intracompany trade between Japanese subsidiaries in America and their
parent companies in Japan contributed $9.5 billion to America's $10 billion
trade deficit with Japan. Id. at 120. See also Richard Aim, Trade Gap Isn't the
Only Imbalance Existing Between U.S., Japan, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 3,
1994, at 1D (citing a 1993 Department of Commerce Study showing that 80% of
Japanese imports into the United States go to Japanese subsidiaries).
4. Foreign Investors Were Net Sellers of Japanese Stock in January,
Figures Show, International Business & Finance Daily (BNA), July 6, 1994,
available in LEXIS, FEDSEC Library, BNAIBF File.
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companies invested $900 million in Japan.5 By contrast, Japa-
nese companies invested $14.7 billion in the United States.6
The U.S.-Japan investment disparity is not a recent phenome-
non. From 1982 to 1992, Japan invested roughly $130 billion in
the United States, while the United States invested $8.8 billion
in Japan.7 In addition, only forty-four percent of U.S. Fortune
500 companies have a direct commercial presence in Japan,
while sixty-eight percent of Japan's top 500 corporations have a
direct commercial presence in the United States.8
Foreign direct investment is central to gaining access to
Japanese markets and reducing the U.S. trade deficit with Ja-
pan. To reduce the trade deficit, the Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) has, thus far, focused its efforts on
lowering Japanese tariff barriers to U.S. products. The USTR
must also work to increase U.S. direct investment in Japan. In-
creased U.S. direct investment in Japan will lead to increased
sales of U.S. goods and services, thereby reducing the U.S. trade
deficit.
This Note addresses how the low level of U.S. direct invest-
ment in Japan widens the trade gap, and whether pursuing in-
creased investment, instead of only tariff reductions, better
serves U.S. trade interests. Part I examines the extent to which
foreign direct investment influences international trade. Part II
reviews the history of foreign direct investment barriers in Ja-
pan and examines recent Japanese efforts to attract foreign di-
rect investment. Part II also defines and distinguishes the
formal and informal Japanese barriers that discourage foreign
direct investment. Part III considers why Japanese programs
aimed at attracting foreign direct investment have failed, ana-
lyzes legal and socioeconomic differences between the United
States and Japan, and determines the extent to which formal
and informal barriers are responsible for the U.S.-Japan invest-
ment gap. Specifically, Part III focuses on official government
5. Foreign Direct Investment in Japan, Country Profile, July 1, 1994,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, COUPRF File.
6. Japanese Direct Investment Abroad, Country Profile, July 1, 1994,
available in LEXIS, ASLAPC Library, COUPRF File.
7. Sterngold, supra note 1, at D17.
8. Japan-Inward Investment Statistics, Market Reports, Aug. 17, 1993,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, M]KTRPT File. The Japanese companies
exert more control over their investments. Eighty-five percent of the Japanese
investments in the United States are wholly-owned subsidiaries, compared to
67% of the U.S. investments in Japan. Id.
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regulations, keiretsu,9 the Antimonopoly Law, and differences
between the United States and Japan in intellectual property
protection. Part IV recommends the use of Section 301 of the
1988 Trade Act 10 to increase U.S. direct investment in Japan.
While recognizing the possible negative consequences connected
to the use of Section 301 sanctions, this Note finds that any
agreement on foreign direct investment between the United
States and Japan should be reached under the auspices of Sec-
tion 301.
I. THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Foreign direct investment expands global trade." A recent
study by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry (MITI) found that, in one year, foreign-owned subsidiar-
ies imported $3.5 billion more goods into Japan than they
exported, thus lowering the trade imbalance with Japan.12 The
USTR recognizes the importance of U.S. direct investment in Ja-
pan, stating in a 1994 report that "[t]he low levels of foreign di-
rect investment in Japan are a direct cause of low import
penetration of Japanese markets."' 3
Foreign direct investment increases international trade in
several ways.14 First, foreign direct investment is the most ef-
fective way to sell goods because a firm's alternatives (domestic
production or licensing of foreign-based production) are less effi-
cient than direct control of foreign-based operations. 15 By sell-
9. Keiretsu are tightly controlled groupings of Japanese businesses that
work together to the detriment of foreign investors and business interests. Alex
Y. Seita & Jiro Tamura, The Historical Background of Japan's Antimonopoly
Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. No. 1, at 115, 121. See infra notes 98-102 and accom-
panying text (describing horizontal and vertical keiretsu).
10. For a description of Section 301 and its application to Japan, see infra
text accompanying notes 139-48.
11. "The underlying point is that [foreign direct] investments, not just low
tariffs and open markets, are the engine for sales in foreign markets."
Sterngold, supra note 1, at D17.
12. Id. Foreign subsidiaries in Japan account for 5% of Japan's exports,
but 17% of its imports. Id.
13. USTR Report Takes Aim at Japan in Foreign Trade Barriers Inventory,
11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 534, 535 (Apr. 6, 1994).
14. Edward Graham, a trade expert at the Institute for International Eco-
nomics, writes: "Overwhelmingly, U.S. exports of manufactured goods go to
countries where there is substantial U.S. direct investment presence."
Sterngold, supra note 1, at D1.
15. See Robert Z. Lawrence, Japan's Low Levels of Inward Investment: The
Role of Inhibitions on Acquisitions, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 85-106
(Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1993).
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ing finished and unfinished goods directly to wholly- or majority-
owned subsidiaries in Japan, a U.S. company can bypass Ja-
pan's multi-layered distribution system, which is responsible for
increasing the price of goods before they reach the Japanese
market. 16 Also, foreign direct investment in Japan is a profita-
ble investment. Japan is an important market because it pro-
vides a solid manufacturing base and a workforce capable of
efficient production in high technology industries. 17
Finally, foreign direct investment establishes a physical
presence for U.S. companies in Japan. When a U.S. company
purchases assets in Japan, by acquiring a Japanese company or
by buying a plant to produce its goods, it promotes international
trade in five distinct ways. First, it eliminates competition by
buying out the competition. By purchasing a competitor en-
gaged in the production of directly competing goods, strategic di-
rect investment secures a greater market share. Second, foreign
direct investment increases Japanese consumer awareness of
the availability of U.S. goods and services. Third, by utilizing
the skills and ingenuity of its Japanese employees, a U.S. corpo-
ration that buys a Japanese company can tap Japanese con-
sumer trends and learn more about consumer preferences. By
recognizing consumer preferences, the U.S. company can tailor
its products and make them more appealing (and user friendly)
to the Japanese consumer.' Fourth, the U.S. company can be
more competitive by directly exposing itself to technological de-
velopments in the Japanese market.1 9 Fifth, the U.S. company,
through its foreign subsidiary, can provide more comprehensive
and efficient post-sale service to its Japanese customers. 20
16. Sterngold, supra note 1, at D17. "In America, for instance, Honda both
makes cars and sells them to dealers through its own American marketing and
distribution subsidiary. But General Motors has no production operations [in
Japan] and sells autos through Japanese importers." Id.
17. Economic Group Urges Measures To Entice More Foreign Investment, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1898 (Nov. 4, 1992) [hereinafter Economic
Group Urges Measures] (citing a 1992 study showing that 70% of foreign firms
view their investments in Japan as successful and 60% evaluate their Japanese
plant performance as high).
18. UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE STUDY GROUP, JAPAN BusINEss: OBSTA-
CLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 31 (1983). In a 1982 survey of Japanese consumers,
43% complained that the main reason for not purchasing imported electric ap-
pliances was because they were difficult to use. Id.
19. Michael Borrus & Judith Goldstein, United States Trade Protectionism:
Institutions, Norms and Practices, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 328, 350 (1987).
20. UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE STUDY GROUP, supra note 18, at 31. In a
1982 survey of Japanese consumers, 30% responded that they did not buy im-
ported electric appliances because of poor post-sale service. Id.
[Vol. 4:305
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While it takes hours or days for a Japanese company to service
its goods in Japan, it can take months for a U.S. exporter that
has no direct presence in Japan.21
Because foreign direct investment expands trade, it follows
that an increase of U.S. direct investment in Japan would re-
duce the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance. To increase U.S. direct
investment in Japan, however, it is important to analyze the
forces that have been, and continue to be, responsible for low
U.S. investment levels.
II. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN JAPAN:
HISTORY, BARRIERS, AND NEW
DEVELOPMENTS
Historically, Japan severely restricted foreign direct invest-
ment through formal government regulations and informal busi-
ness practices. Long before World War II, Japan imposed
government restrictions on capital inflows. 22 From 1945 until
1967, Japan virtually prohibited foreign direct investment.23
After 1967, Japan generally limited foreign direct investment in
Japanese companies to joint ventures or sales.24 Because direct
investment was formally denied to U.S. producers during the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, many U.S. industries licensed their
technologies to Japanese companies. 25 With the licensed tech-
nology, Japanese companies "refined their products and devel-
oped highly efficient manufacturing systems, while
simultaneously being protected from the then superior products
and productivity of foreign companies."26 This strategy gave
Japanese companies a competitive edge over American compa-
nies in Japan, and simultaneously helped to prevent American
companies from gaining an investment foothold in Japan.27 Ja-
21. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 2621, EAST ASIA: REGIONAL Eco.
NOMIC INTEGRATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 45 (1993) [here-
inafter REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION].
22. ENCARNATION, supra note 3, at 6.
23. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PuB. No. 1437, FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL
TARGETING AND rrs EFFECTS ON U.S. INDUSTRIES-PHASE I: JAPAN 72 (1993)
[hereinafter FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL TARGETING]. The Foreign Investment Law of
1950 allowed the Japanese government to regulate the flow of foreign capital
and technology into Japan. Until 1967, severe restrictions on foreign direct in-
vestment were in effect. Id.
24. Id. at 47.
25. Borrus & Goldstein, supra note 19, at 351.
26. Id.
27. LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN
HIGH-TEcHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 87 (1992). D'Andrea Tyson explains how the
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pan created investment barriers to counteract the threat of U.S.-
owned subsidiaries posing a competitive challenge to Japanese
industry at home. 28 These restrictive policies served to discour-
age U.S. direct investment in Japan, while U.S. policy and busi-
ness practices allowed Japanese direct investment in the United
States.29
A. FORMAL AND INFORMAL BARRIERS AFFECTING FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN JAPAN
To eliminate Japanese investment barriers, it is necessary
to understand what they are and how they operate. It is also
important to identify the barriers that U.S. negotiators can rea-
sonably expect the Japanese government to eliminate. Some
barriers are easy to eliminate, while some barriers are so deeply
entrenched in Japanese culture and business philosophy that
government action will have little meaningful effect.
The obstacles that foreign direct investors face in Japan can
be divided into formal and informal investment barriers. For-
mal barriers consist of any official government action or regula-
tion that directly hinders foreign direct investment. Informal
barriers consist of private business practices, cultural phenom-
ena and economic trends that negatively affect foreign direct
investment.
1. Formal Government Barriers
Industry specific government regulations are among the
most restrictive formal barriers to foreign direct investment in
Japanese semiconductor industry was protected from U.S. foreign direct
investment:
Initially, American companies tended to discount the significance of
these barriers, treating them as mildly irritating rather than life
threatening. But as the protected Japanese market grew and ominous
evidence of the successful Japanese challenge mounted, American com-
panies began a 15-year struggle to open the Japanese market and to
deter predatory Japanese business practices through various trade pol-
icy initiatives.
This struggle reaped little in the way of real gains, and by the
early 1980's the American companies watched in disbelief as the Japa-
nese companies surged into the open American market.
Id.
28. ENCARNATION, supra note 3, at 6.
29. Id. at 118. "After 1959, a decade was required for Japanese FDI in
America to double; but for this FDI to double again, only one-half that time had
to pass, the five years between 1969 and 1974. And thereafter, Japanese FDI in
the United States doubled every year-and-a-half at least through the end of the
[1980s]." Id. (citation omitted).
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Japan. These restrictions and prohibitions have regulated pri-
mary industry in agriculture, air transport, banking and securi-
ties, broadcasting, forestry and fisheries, insurance, leather and
leather products manufacturing, marine transport, mining, oil,
and telecommunications. 30 Most of these regulations take the
form of restrictions on, and even prohibitions against, foreign di-
rect investment. 31
Another formal government barrier is legislation that dis-
courages foreign direct investment. For many years, the For-
eign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law32 allowed the
Japanese government to restrict foreign direct investment and
the importation of technology in any industrial sector if such im-
ports might have "an adverse effect on similar domestic activi-
ties or the smooth functioning of the Japanese economy."33 In
1992, the Japanese government amended the law to make it less
restrictive in most industries. The amendments, however, did
not cover industries related to national security, public order,
and protection of the general public.34 In addition, the law re-
quires that foreign firms consult with the Ministry of Finance
and Bank of Japan before undertaking any investment transac-
tion.3 5 This gives keiretsu36 early warning of mergers and acqui-
sitions and, because of extensive cross-shareholding, 37 gives
shareholders an opportunity to challenge foreign purchases of
Japanese companies. 38 Additionally, the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission imposes approval requirements on technology
30. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PuB. No. 2291, PHASE I: JAPAN'S Dismau-
TION SYSTEM AND OvriONS FOR IMPROVING U.S. ACCESS 87 (1990) [hereinafter
JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM].
31. Id. In 1992, some of these regulations were repealed, but the Japanese
government reserved the right to reject any investment that is not available on
a reciprocal basis to Japanese investors in America. In addition, it reserved the
right to reject any investment posing "a threat to national security." Lawrence,
supra note 15, at 86 n.1.
32. Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku boeki no kanri ni kansuru horitsu (For-
eign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law) Law No. 228 of 1949, as
amended (1968), translated in 5 EIBuN-HoREI SHA LAW BULLETIN SERIES AA.
33. JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 91.
34. Economic Group Urges Measures, supra note 17, at 1898.
35. Keidanren Says Government Measures to Help Foreign Bidders Are In-
adequate, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 11, 12 (Jan. 5, 1994).
36. For a description of the two types of keiretsu, horizontal and vertical,
see infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
37. The most notable barrier to foreign direct investment in Japan is exten-
sive cross-shareholding among Japanese companies. D'ANDREA TYSON, supra
note 27, at 7. Cross-shareholding prevents the acquisition of Japanese busi-
nesses by would-be foreign investors. Id.
38. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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transfers from foreign companies to their Japanese
subsidiaries. 39
Other formal government barriers to foreign direct invest-
ment include a ten-year deficit carry-over period for foreign-affil-
iated firms,40 a ten percent withholding tax on dividends paid by
subsidiaries in Japan to their overseas parents, 41 and inefficient
intellectual property protection for foreign companies. 42 In ad-
dition, U.S. attorneys do not have the same opportunities in Ja-
pan as Japanese attorneys have in the United States. In the
District of Columbia and New York, for example, Japanese law-
yers may practice U.S. law as foreign legal consultants and form
partnerships with U.S. lawyers. 43 To a limited extent, U.S. law
firms can now form partnerships with Japanese law firms, but
in reality this development is only a "small step toward liberali-
zation."44 U.S. law firms can play a constructive role in direct
investment, both as a form of direct investment themselves and
as investment facilitators capable of mastering the intricacies of
Japanese law.45 Thus, the Japanese restrictions on foreign at-
39. Japan-Destination Japan, Market Reports, Sep. 19, 1994, available
in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, MKTRPT File.
40. USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing Topic: U.S.-Japan Framework
Talks, Federal News Service, Jan. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, EXEC Library,
FEDNEW File. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alan Larson explained the
U.S. position regarding a loss carry-forward provision, also known as a deficit
carryover period. A loss carry-forward provision allows a firm to carry forward
into future tax years losses it incurs as a result of start-up costs. Id. In 1994,
the Japanese government increased the deficit carryover period from seven to
ten years. Id. Since the deficit carryover period is 15 years in the United
States, U.S. negotiators have requested that the Japanese government increase
their period to 15 years as well. Id.
41. Economic Group Urges Measures, supra note 17, at 1899.
42. See Roziana Hamsawi, Malaysia: Ministry Lists 6 Cases of Unfair Jap-
anese Practices, Business Times (Singapore), July 21, 1994, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, ALLASI File (noting a Malaysian report identifying Japan as
one of the countries on the "Special 301 watch list" from which the United
States seeks stronger intellectual property protection). For an explanation of
the differences between U.S. and Japanese intellectual property protection, see
infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
43. Donald L. Morgan, Regulation of Foreign Lawyers: Modest Changes to
be Made, East Asian Executive Reports, June 15, 1994, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, EASIAN File.
44. Countries Seen Continuing to Seek Liberalized Trade in Legal Services,
11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1247, 1248 (Aug. 10, 1994).
45. Japan-Country Marketing Plan FY94, Market Reports, Sept. 15,
1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, MKTRPT File. The United States
wants Japan to liberalize its laws to permit U.S. attorneys to hire and work
with Japanese attorneys. The Japan Federation of Bar Associations and the
Ministry of Justice oppose any such liberalization, while Keidanren, the Japan
Federation of Economic Organizations, supports liberalization. Id.
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torneys are another barrier to large-scale foreign direct
investment.
2. Informal Barriers
While formal barriers greatly discourage U.S. direct invest-
ment in Japan, informal barriers are also responsible for the in-
vestment gap. Informal barriers consist of cultural and business
practices, and natural market forces. The interlocking corporate
relationships between Japanese businesses, or keiretsu, repre-
sent a significant informal barrier to foreign direct invest-
ment.46 Keiretsu create barriers primarily through cross-
shareholding.47 This effectively prevents foreign investors from
purchasing controlling interests in Japanese companies, and
prevents foreign firms from establishing an investment foothold
in Japan.48
Because U.S. investors have great difficulty acquiring Japa-
nese companies,4 9 they are forced to rely on "greenfield" star-
tups, 50 where an investor starts a business from scratch. In
addition, keiretsu discourage foreign direct investment by
quashing foreign shareholder rights.51 Foreign investors are
unable to exercise control over Japanese businesses, even when
they are substantial shareholders.5 2
In analyzing Japanese investment barriers, it is important
to note that the Japanese have made concessions concerning
keiretsu transactions. The United States and Japan recently ad-
dressed this issue in the Structural Impediments Initiative,53
and, as a result, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission will moni-
46. Economic Group Urges Measures, supra note 17, at 1899.
47. JAPAN's DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 90. "Practices such as
cross-shareholding may keep as much as 70 percent of total stocks in Japan
from changing hands." Id.
48. Japan-Country Marketing Plan FY'94, supra note 45, pt. V.B; see in-
fra text accompanying notes 103-04.
49. Lawrence, supra note 15, at 87.
50. Id. Greenfield investments usually involve higher startup costs than a
merger or acquisition. Id. at 92.
51. One commentator identified a possible cultural explanation for the re-
fusal to recognize foreign shareholder rights. "[Tihe Japanese concept of a firm
places less emphasis on the role of stockholders and more emphasis on the
rights of other stakeholders-in particular, employees and management." Id.
In addition, the Japanese word for "takeover bid" (nottori) can also mean "hi-
jack." Id.
52. For further discussions of foreign shareholder rights in Japan, see infra
notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
53. Lawrence, supra note 15, at 101. In July 1989, President Bush and
Prime Minister Uno began the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) to iden-
tify and solve structural problems in both countries. The SII was later used to
1995] 313
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tor keiretsu practices and try to eliminate restraints that hinder
fair competition. 54
A more fundamental barrier to foreign direct investment,
and perhaps an underlying reason for keiretsu cross-sharehold-
ing protection techniques, is Japanese culture. Whereas take-
overs of businesses and corporations by foreigners are
commonplace in the United States, they are rare in Japan. In
Japan, the corporation is a kind of family, and the employees are
members of that family. 55 When a foreigner (gaijin) purchases
the corporation, it is seen as a sign of weakness, and the "family"
is disgraced.56 The loyalty of Japanese employees to their com-
panies even interferes with friendly mergers. 57 These cultural
phenomena demonstrate a xenophobia with respect to foreign
direct investment in Japan.
Despite keiretsu and the complexities of Japanese culture,
some argue that the true reason for low levels of foreign direct
investment in Japan is market forces, over which neither the
Japanese government nor the business community exert any di-
rect control. These market forces consist primarily of high real
estate costs and the high value of the yen relative to the U.S.
dollar.58 Thus, the conclusion is that these two forces make it
economically imprudent to purchase assets in Japan. Foreign
investors pass up Japan in favor of lower real estate, labor, and
startup costs in neighboring East Asian countries.
Two facts rebut the market forces argument, however.
First, the high value of the yen is insignificant in the context of
foreign direct investment. As most direct investment in Japan
is profitable and dependable, higher investment costs lead to
higher investment returns, and higher yen profits naturally
address Japanese barriers to foreign direct investment. Japan-Country Mar-
keting Plan FY'94, supra note 45.
54. Lawrence, supra note 15, at 101; see also Seita & Tamura, supra note 9,
at 121 n.26.
55. JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 90.
"56. Id.
57. Lawrence, supra note 15, at 92-93. "[Tlhe loyalty felt by employees and
management to large firms in a system (often characterized by lifetime employ-
ment) stands in the way of even friendly mergers in which companies lose their
identity." Id.
58. During early 1995, the U.S. dollar's value has been very low relative to
the Japanese yen and the German mark. Alan S. Cullison, Dollar Sinks
Against Yen on Comments Japan Isn't Likely to Cut Discount Rate, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 10, 1995, at C16 (citing the dollar's fall to a post-WWII low of V83.68 on
April 7).
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translate into higher dollar profits.5 9 Second, although real es-
tate costs are extremely high in some areas of Japan, they are
reasonable in others.60 Real estate prices in rural areas are less
than one-tenth of those in the largest urban centers (Tokyo and
Osaka).61 More foreign based firms are finding hospitable fac-
tory settings in Japan's rural areas, and are taking advantage of
the special subsidies and incentives that local governments
offer.62
Such incentive programs differ greatly from the open hostil-
ity faced by foreign direct investors in the past. Historically, the
Japanese government actively prevented foreign direct invest-
ment through a complex body of laws and regulations. Indi-
rectly, the government's inaction discouraged foreign direct
investment by allowing discriminatory keiretsu practices to con-
tinue. Currently, the difference between Japanese inward and
outward direct investment continues to be great. Foreign direct
investment in Japan shows no sign of increasing and Japanese
outward investment shows no sign of decreasing. 63 Neverthe-
less, Japanese attitudes toward foreign direct investment seem
to be changing as part of a new effort to lure foreign direct
investment.
59. Sterngold, supra note 1, at D17; see also Simon Mansfield, Japan: Sur-
vey-Deep Pockets Needed For Foreign Business Entrants, Australian Financial
Review, Oct. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, AUST Library, ALLNWS File (citing
data from MITI, showing that in 1993, foreign companies enjoyed a 3% profit
margin while Japanese companies enjoyed only a 1.8% profit margin).
60. Nobuyuki Oishi, Rural Charm, Low Cost Beckon Foreign Investors,
NiKKEi WKLY., June 27, 1994, at 3.
61. Id.
62. Id. A MITI panel report on foreign investments in Japan noted that
outlying areas not only offer lower land and labor costs but also are attractive
markets in themselves. Id. For example, the panel claimed that Hokkaido's
market exceeds the gross national product of Denmark. Id.
63. In April 1994, foreign direct investment in Japan totaled $295 million,
and decreased to $74 million in May. Foreign Investors Resume Purchases of
Japanese Securities in May, Data Show, International Business & Finance
Daily (BNA), July 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC Library, BNAIBF File.
In April 1994, Japanese direct investment overseas totaled $2.385 billion, and
decreased to $1.943 billion in May. Id. In June 1994, foreign direct investment
in Japan totaled $351 million, and decreased to $339 million in July. Foreign
Investors Sell Japanese Securities in July, Data Show, International Business
& Finance Daily (BNA), Sept. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC Library,
BNAIBF File. In June 1994, Japanese direct investment overseas totaled
$4.606 billion, and decreased to $2.069 billion in July. Id.
1995]
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B. RECENT EFFORTS To ATTRACT FOREIGN DIRECT
INvESTMENT
Japanese attitudes toward foreign direct investment
changed for several reasons. First, the Japanese recognized that
greater participation by foreign companies in Japan encouraged
Japanese companies to restructure and become more competi-
tive.64 Second, foreign direct investment created jobs. The Jap-
anese saw foreign direct investment as a means to replace jobs
being relocated in cheaper labor markets throughout Asia.65
Third, threats of economic sanctions by foreign governments be-
came more concrete. 66
In response to these trends, the Japanese government pub-
licly devoted itself to recruiting more foreign direct invest-
ment,67 and passed several laws designed to accomplish this
goal. For example, in 1992 the Japanese government passed
The Provisional Law for Import Promotion and Direct Foreign
64. James Paradise, Investment Benefits Japan, Says Report, UPI, Sept. 2,
1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, UPI File. The restructuring of Jap-
anese corporations lowers domestic consumer prices. A Japanese research in-
stitute reported that over the long-term, an increase in foreign investment is
likely to benefit Japan by accelerating the development of new leading indus-
tries and acting as a catalyst for the creation of more multinational companies
and more consumer-driven markets. Id. (citing a report by the Long-Term
Credit Bank of Japan Research Institute).
65. Oishi, supra note 60, at 3. In 1994, the Japanese unemployment rate
reached its highest level since Japan began recording unemployment statistics
in 1953. Nina Field, New Zealand: Surge In Building A Boost For Kiwis-The
International Economy, Australian Financial Review, Feb. 2, 1995, available in
LEXIS, AUST Library, ALLNWS File. As more Japanese businesses move "off-
shore" to cheaper labor markets throughout Asia, the Japanese economy bene-
fits from the jobs that foreign direct investment creates.
66. On March 3, 1994, President Clinton reinstated "Super 301," giving the
USTR authority to identify countries that unfairly burden U.S. direct invest-
ment and impose sanctions until the barriers to U.S. direct investment are
eliminated. Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities, Exec. Order No.
12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994) (hereinafter Trade Expansion Priorities].
67. In 1994, MITI released a White Paper reporting that Japan needed to
upgrade its social, economic and other infrastructures to enhance investment
opportunities for foreign companies. Japan Must Enhance Its Investment Ap-
peal: White Paper, Japan Economic Newswire, May 17, 1994, available in
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, JEN File [hereinafter White Paper]. The White Paper
stated that "[s]uch efforts would eventually contribute not only to expanding
direct foreign investment in this country but also to raising the overall living
standards of the Japanese people." Id. In October 1994, U.S. and Japanese
negotiators "agreed on the importance" of foreign direct investment in Japan at
a meeting held at MITI. Japan, U.S. Agree on More Investment in Japan, Jiji
Press Ticker Service, Oct. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, JIJI
File.
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Investment. 68 Under this law, in 1993, the Japanese govern-
ment guaranteed its first loan to a foreign company with the ex-
press intent of increasing foreign direct investment.69
In addition, the Japanese government has brought together
government and business leaders to create organizations
designed to examine ways to increase foreign direct investment.
In June 1993, the Japanese government created the Foreign In-
vestment in Japan Development Corporation (FIND).70 FIND is
a quasi-governmental organization, made up of government offi-
cials and business leaders, serving as a centralized point of in-
formation for foreign investors and supporting foreign
companies that want to invest in Japan.71 FIND provides the
following five services: general advice and information, 72 staff
recruiting services,73 training courses,74 temporary personnel
services, 75 and customized research services at a reasonable
cost.
76
In July 1993, unverified reports circulated regarding a MITI
initiative that included "model areas" for foreign direct invest-
ments. 77 These areas would offer government subsidized rents
for offices, houses and apartments, as well as educational and
medical facilities for the exclusive use of foreign firms. 78
Although, these "model areas" have not yet materialized, they
68. The Provisional Law for Import Promotion and Direct Foreign Invest-
ment enables the Japanese government to guarantee loans made by the Bank of
Tokyo, Ltd., to foreign firms who have operated in Japan for less than five
years. The government can guarantee loans of up to $9.4 million. Japanese
Government Fund Gives Loan Guarantee to British Firm, 10 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 45, at 1937 (Nov. 17, 1993).
69. Id. On November 11, 1993, the Japanese government guaranteed a
five-year $1.22 million loan to Willett International, the Japanese subsidiary of
Willett International, Ltd., of London. Id.
70. Japan-Foreign Investment Support Program, Market Reports, Aug.
17, 1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, MKTRPT File.
71. Id. FIND was created under the 1992 Law on Extraordinary Measures
for the Promotion of Imports and the Facilitation of Foreign Direct Investment
in Japan. Id.
72. Id. FIND provides information on regional investment incentives and
provides the use of its own staff, which consists of management consultants,
lawyers, accountants and other investment professionals. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. FIND provides training courses to foreign investors on administra-
tive regulations and incentives, as well as business development. Id.
75. Id. FIND provides temporary secretarial, translation and administra-
tive assistance personnel services at a low cost. Id.
76. Id.
77. Japan-Inward Investment Statistics, Market Reports, Aug. 17, 1993,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, MKTRPT File.
78. Id.
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may provide an important and innovative possibility for U.S.-
Japan negotiations in the future.
The 1994 MITI White Paper demonstrates Japan's renewed
commitment to expanding foreign direct investment. 79 The
White Paper stated that "rules and regulations serving as barri-
ers to foreign direct investment should be eased, corporate re-
search and development activities should be reinforced, and
capital market regulations should be relaxed." 0
In July 1994, the Japanese government set up the Japan
Investment Council to help promote foreign direct investment.8 1
Given that the Japanese Prime Minister heads this ministerial
forum, it is Japan's strongest political commitment to expanding
foreign direct investment.8 2 Although the investment council
provides no tangible services to foreign companies, it is
"designed to gather the views of, and problems faced by, foreign
investors in Japan."83
These programs reflect a new Japanese attitude toward for-
eign direct investment. The Japanese government acknowl-
edges the benefits of foreign direct investment and believes that
recruiting foreign direct investment is in the country's best in-
terest. However, the new Japanese attitude and accompanying
programs do not offset a history of discrimination against for-
eign direct investment, restrictive government regulations, lax
enforcement of antimonopoly law, keiretsu practices, and weak
intellectual property protection.
III. EVALUATION OF JAPANESE BARRIERS TO
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Japanese programs to recruit foreign direct investment
have failed to address the fundamental reasons for the lack of
foreign direct investment in Japan-restrictive governmental
regulations and anticompetitive business practices. There is
concern that the new programs, while showing political support
for increased foreign direct investment, serve no more than a
public relations function.8 4 As statistics show, the recent Japa-
nese efforts to recruit U.S. direct investment have, so far, failed
79. White Paper, supra note 67.
80. Id.
81. Government Sets Up Investment Council, Jiji Press Ticker Service, July
15, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, JIJI File.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. In July 1992, the investment committee of the Tokyo-based European
Business Community criticized efforts by MITI to encourage foreign direct in-
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to close the investment gap.85 The Japanese government must
not only repeal existing formal regulations, but also expand and
more strictly enforce laws against informal anticompetitive busi-
ness practices.
A. REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Japan regulates foreign direct investment more than most
countries.8 6 Marked differences between foreign direct invest-
ment regulation in the United States and Japan largely explain
the direct investment gap.8 7 The Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law88 severely hinders foreign investors by re-
quiring them to adhere to burdensome administrative invest-
ment procedures.8 9 Individual industry regulations hinder
foreign investors to an even greater extent.90
Transnational variation in equity investments by foreign di-
rect investors provides convincing evidence of the extent to
which restrictive regulations can affect investment decisions. 9 1
In countries with few discriminatory regulations, such as Can-
vestment as serving public relations purposes, rather than providing concrete
help for foreign investors. Japan-Inward Investment Statistics, supra note 77.
85. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. Economic Group Urges Measures, supra note 17, at 1898. In a 1992
report, Keidanren, the Federation of Economic Organizations of Japan, admit-
ted that "Japan has considerably more regulations on business than most other
countries. This undoubtedly obstructs the entry of new firms." Id.
87. In Japan, mergers and acquisitions must be approved by the Japan
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) under the Anti-Monopoly Law, and tender of-
fers must be filed with, and approved by, the Ministry of Finance. Paul M.
Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, International Corporate Equity Acquisitions: Who,
Where and Why?, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 238-39 (Kenneth A. Froot ed.,
1993). This differs from U.S. foreign investment regulation. Id. In the United
States, mergers and acquisitions are subject to antitrust regulations, though
these regulations have rarely been enforced. Id.
88. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
89. Economic Group Urges Measures, supra note 17, at 1898. Although
1992 amendments to the Law have simplified foreign investment procedures,
investors still must consult with the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan
regarding the details of an investment. "Such practices lack transparency and
tend to result in excessive intervention by authorities, and ... should be cor-
rected," said the 1992 Keidanren report. Id. While the JFTC has recently nar-
rowed the scope of the types of contracts covered by this requirement, "the
notification requirement has been used to challenge foreign direct investment
that is disadvantageous to Japanese companies." Japan-Country Marketing
Plan FY'94, supra note 45.
90. Economic Group Urges Measures, supra note 17, at 1898. The 1992
Keidanren report stated that individual industry regulations are "actually more
responsible for restricting foreign investments than is the Foreign Exchange
Control Law." Id.
91. Healy & Palepu, supra note 87, at 242.
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ada, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the
United States, foreign investment averages eighty-one percent
of domestic investment.92 In contrast, in countries with more
burdensome regulations, such as Australia, France, Japan and
Sweden, foreign investment averages twenty-eight percent of
domestic investment. This data suggests that the discrimina-
tory regulations in these countries discourage foreign invest-
ment.93 Unlike Japan, U.S. regulations have not significantly
discriminated between domestic and foreign investors, except
where national security interests are concerned. 94
Beyond eliminating restrictive investment regulations, the
Japanese government must also reform its tax laws that burden
foreign direct investment. For instance, Japan must lower the
withholding tax on dividends paid by a subsidiary in Japan to its
overseas parent.95 Another barrier to increased foreign direct
investment is the high pro forma corporate tax rate.96 High cor-
porate tax rates encourage foreign investors to invest in coun-
tries with lower rates. In response to the burdens of the
Japanese tax system on foreign direct investment, the United
States and Japan have discussed Japanese tax reform. 97
To effectively lessen the investment gap, it is important that
the Japanese government offer more than government programs
to assist foreign investors. The Japanese government must go to
the source of the investment gap and repeal or modify the dis-
criminatory regulations that initially created it.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Before 1988, no special U.S. regulatory restrictions on foreign intercor-
porate equity investments existed. Id. at 241. After 1988, investments with
national security implications were subject to administrative review. Id. By
contrast, Japan required government notification and approval for foreign ac-
quirers of stakes exceeding 10%. Id. Once approved, a transaction had to be
completed within 30 days through a Japanese broker. Id.
95. Economic Group Urges Measures, supra note 17, at 1899. The 1992
Keidanren report urged that Japan reduce, from ten percent to five percent, the
current withholding tax on dividends paid by a subsidiary in Japan to its over-
seas parent, consistent with the Model Convention of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Id.
96. Joel Slemrod, Tax Cacophony and the Benefits of Free Trade 21 (July
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade). Currently the Japanese pro forma corporate tax rate is set at 51%, com-
pared to 38% in the United States. Id.
97. Japan, U.S. Agree on More Investment in Japan, supra note 67.
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B. KEIRETSU
Within Japan's economy, two types of keiretsu exist: verti-
cal and horizontal. A horizontal keiretsu consists of a grouping
of companies in different industries, commonly centered on a
major bank.9 8 A vertical keiretsu is a grouping of companies
within a single industry or a limited number of related indus-
tries.9 9 A vertical keiretsu is dominated by one firm, usually a
large manufacturing company, and consists of the dominant
firm together with its subsidiaries, affiliates, and associated
firms (such as suppliers).' 0 0 To thrive in the Japanese economy,
horizontal keiretsu developed subtle mechanisms of collabora-
tion, like extensive cross-holdings of stock, and vertical keiretsu
developed close links through exchanges of equity.1 0 1 Keiretsu
severely hinder foreign direct investment by blocking the acqui-
sition of Japanese companies. 0 2
Strong incentives exist within keiretsu to prevent even one
member from coming under foreign control. 0 3 Due to the
tightly knit nature of a keiretsu, allowing foreign control of even
one link of the keiretsu chain threatens the non-transparency
and effectiveness of keiretsu buyer-supplier networks and the
collusive, arguably anticompetitive, decision-making
processes.' 0 4
The Economist Intelligence Unit, an on-line trade strategy
service for U.S. investors, states that "[foreign investors [in Ja-
pan] are perceived as a threat to the extent that they try to exert
98. Seita & Tamura, supra note 9, at 121 n.24; see Lawrence, supra note
15, at 93.
99. Seita & Tamura, supra note 9, at 121 n.24.
100. Id.; see also Lawrence, supra note 15, at 93.
101. See Lawrence, supra note 15, at 100-04 (discussing the attributes of
keiretsu within the Japanese economy).
102. See id. at 87 (stating that "[sitatistically significant evidence suggests,
indeed, that keiretsu linkages inhibit FDI in Japan").
103. Japan-Country Marketing Plan FY94, supra note 45; see also Law-
rence, supra note 15, at 105 (stating that "It~he expansion of stock cross-hold-
ings among keiretsu members and other Japanese firms during the 1970s was
an explicit device to prevent foreigners from buying Japanese companies").
104. The Japanese defend keiretsu practices with "two diametrically op-
posed arguments." Lawrence, supra note 15, at 101. Some argue that keiretsu
have no significant economic effects and are no different from arrangements in
other countries (i.e., vertical integration and conglomerates). Id. at 101-02.
Others argue that keiretsu are a fundamental aspect of Japanese economic suc-
cess. Id. at 102. The close links between assemblers and suppliers in vertical
keiretsu enhance the transfer of technology and permit reliable supply while
preserving corporate flexibility. Id.
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active control over a local firm's management." 10 5 "Minor own-
ership stakes for simple investment purposes are completely
welcome and open,"10 6 but mergers and acquisitions and hostile
takeovers are not.' 0 7 U.S. direct investment in Japan is primar-
ily in majority-owned Japanese companies. Throughout the rest
of the world, the exact opposite is true. Worldwide, U.S. inves-
tors invest more in majority-owned U.S. companies.' 08 Clearly,
U.S. investors do not have the same investment opportunities in
Japan as they do throughout the rest of the world.
Keiretsu block foreign acquisitions of Japanese firms in sev-
eral ways. One important method is through extensive cross-
shareholding between keiretsu companies and owners. 1° 9
Although less significant than during the period of Japan's "bub-
ble economy" (1987-90), cross-shareholding remains prevalent
in Japan. 1 0 For example, Japanese companies depend more on
banks than do U.S. companies."' A merger or acquisition in-
volving a Japanese company will not succeed if the controlling
Japanese bank disagrees with it.112 Japanese banks therefore
105. 3.2 Incoming Direct Investment, Financing Foreign Operations, July 1,
1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, FINFOR File.
106. Id.
107. JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 90 (noting one Japa-
nese business person's opinion that "to sell a company in Japan is considered
shameful, in much the same way as an ancient warlord would kill himself
before surrendering his castle, or as a captain would choose to go down with his
ship").
108. Lawrence, supra note 15, at 89-90. In 1990, U.S. majority-owned com-
panies accounted for 78% of worldwide U.S. foreign direct investment assets.
Only 34% of U.S. foreign direct investment assets in Japan were in U.S. major-
ity-owned companies. Id.
109. JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 90. The USITC report
stated that:
Banks, for example, may own blocks of shares in companies to which
they lend, or insurance companies and brokerage firms may buy stocks
as a method of promoting long-term business relationships. This can
have the result of keeping stock prices high and making it difficult for
outsiders to buy into the Japanese market.
Id.
110. Kiyoshi Mori, Industrial Sea Change: How Changes in Keiretsu Are
Opening the Japanese Market, 12 BROOKINGS REV. No. 4, at 20, 23 (1994) (stat-
ing that the conditions in Japan's stock market that encouraged cross-share-
holding have not changed substantially).
111. JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 90. "The average debt-
equity ratio of Japanese companies of about 80:20 makes them more dependent
on banks than U.S. firms, with an average debt-equity ratios [sic] much closer
to 50 percent." Id. "As a result of cross-shareholding, banks hold more than 40
percent of all stock listed on all Japanese stock exchanges, other companies 30
percent, and individuals only a little more than 20 percent." Mori, supra note
110, at 22.
112. JAPAN'S DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 90.
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possess a greater capacity than their American counterparts to
prevent unfriendly foreign direct investments.113
A result of cross-shareholding among Japanese companies
is that less than one-half of Japanese corporations' stock is pub-
licly traded.' 14 Cross-shareholding strengthens the link be-
tween suppliers, buyers and financiers, thus making Japanese
markets less transparent and more difficult for foreign direct in-
vestors to crack."15 Additionally, the keiretsu structure com-
promises the rights of foreign shareholders. In 1989, T. Boone
Pickens, a Texas oilman and takeover specialist, owned twenty-
six percent of a Japanese automobile parts manufacturer (Koito
Manufacturing Company)."16 Although he was the largest
shareholder, Pickens failed to gain representation on Koito's
board of directors, and was refused basic financial and operating
information."- 7 Koito's action resulted in a considerable U.S.
political response and renewed U.S. scrutiny of keiretsu
dealings."18
Since no international investment code exists, these Japa-
nese practices do not violate any international legal obliga-
tions."19 However, some keiretsu practices violate U.S. antitrust
law,' 20 and some violate Japanese law.' 2 ' To increase foreign
113. Id. One foreign participant in a failed takeover attempt of the Minebea
Ball Bearing Co. complained that he "could not find a single Japanese bank or
securities house to help in any capacity with his bid." ARON VINER, INSIDE JAPA-
NESE FiNANCIAL MARKETS 90 (1988).
114. D'ANDREA TYSON, supra note 27, at 279. In contrast, most U.S. compa-
nies' stock is freely available in the U.S. securities market. Id.
115. See Lawrence, supra note 15, at 102.
116. Farnsworth, supra note 52, at D6.
117. Id. In defense of its actions, Koito explained that under Japanese law
stockholders are not entitled to receive detailed financial information about a
company. Id.
118. Seventeen U.S. senators complained in a letter to Carla A. Hills, the
then-U.S. Trade Representative, that "Koito, like other major Japanese corpo-
rations, is dominated by a cartel-like group of corporate and financial institu-
tions. This informal, but nonetheless powerful, structure effectively limits the
ability for foreign shareholders to exercise any meaningful rights." Id.
119. Lawrence, supra note 15, at 105.
120. See Ronald J. Ostrow, U.S. Aims New Antitrust Policy Abroad, L.A.
TIMES, April 4, 1992, at D1 (announcing a U.S. Department of Justice amend-
ment to its antitrust enforcement policy, enabling the Department to challenge
foreign businesses that blocked access to their home markets); Yoshikuni
Sugiyama, U.S. Toughens Trade Surplus; Broaden International Use of Anti-
trust Laws, DAILY YoMIUR, Apr. 5, 1992, at 1 (stating that the new policy will
apply to Japanese enterprises found to have harmed their U.S. counterparts by
actions that violate U.S. antitrust laws).
121. "In a particularly noteworthy case in 1989 (Shuwa versus Chujitsuya),
the court found that efforts to dilute Shuwa's shares by an exchange of stocks at
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direct investment, the Japanese government must strengthen
and enforce its Antimonopoly Law to curb anticompetitive busi-
ness practices.
C. ANrIMONOPOLY LAW
Japan's reluctance to enforce its Antimonopoly Law122 is a
major point of friction between the United States and Japan.
The Antimonopoly Law is the primary law regulating competi-
tion in Japan, and U.S. officials cite its lax enforcement as a bar-
rier to direct investment.123  Weak enforcement of the
Antimonopoly Law permits keiretsu to maintain anticompetitive
business relationships. 124 Japan permits keiretsu ties between
manufacturers and distributors that would be prohibited under
U.S. antitrust law. The Antimonopoly Law is ineffective be-
cause the Japanese government has failed to enforce it and be-
cause the Japanese government has granted so many
exemptions from it.1 25
During the 1991 Structural Impediments Initiative (SII)
talks, the Japanese government assured the United States that
keiretsu firms would not hinder fair competition in the future. 126
American officials have since complained, however, that the Jap-
anese government has failed to honor its promise. 127 To in-
crease foreign direct investment, Japan must strengthen the
Antimonopoly Law, eliminate the exemptions, and enforce its
prohibitions.
low prices between two targets was unfair. This was the first time a Japanese
court declared an antitakeover practice unfair." Lawrence, supra note 15, at 94.
122. Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi to Kbsei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru
H~ritsu (Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of
Fair Trade), Law No. 54 of 1947 (as currently amended), translated in THE FAIR
TRADE COMMISSION OF JAPAN, JAPANESE COMPETITION LAw: ACT CONCERNING
PROHIBITION OF PRIVATE MONOPOLY AND MAINTENANCE OF FAIR TRADE (1991).
123. Seita & Tamura, supra note 9, at 119-20.
124. Id. at 120-21. For example, a manufacturer can require its associated
retailers to deal exclusively in its products, thereby discriminating against the
goods produced by a foreign company in Japan. Id. at 121 n.22.
125. Id. at 122. Seita and Tamura state that "[sleparate laws provide many
legal exemptions from the AML [Antimonopoly Law] for cartel behavior," and
that "[w]hat was initially given on the one hand to curb anticompetitive behav-
ior-the AML-was later balanced on the other by a desire to prevent harm to
the Japanese economy-the exemptions from the AML." Id. at 123.
126. Id. at 121 n.26.
127. Id. at 122.
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D. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Japan does not provide adequate intellectual property pro-
cedures for U.S. direct investors.' 28 The United States provides
more timely intellectual property protection for foreign investors
than does Japan.129 While the U.S. Patent Office will issue a
patent in about eighteen months, 130 it can take five to six years
for the Japanese Patent Office to grant a patent.'31 During this
period no effective legal protection exists. 132 In Japan, registra-
tion of a trademark takes an average of four years, while regis-
tration in the United States takes an average of thirteen
months.133
Although Japanese intellectual property laws do not specifi-
cally discriminate against U.S. interests, they generally make
Japan a less attractive market for research and development. In
high technology industries, technology is "new" for a very short
period. Without more timely intellectual property procedures,
technological innovations become outdated by the time they are
patented. To attract foreign direct investment, Japan must im-
prove its intellectual property procedures.
Restrictive government regulation, keiretsu practices, inad-
equate enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law and insufficient
intellectual property protection all contribute to the huge invest-
ment gap between the United States and Japan. Any effort to
increase U.S. direct investment in Japan, and correspondingly
decrease the U.S. trade deficit with Japan, must first recognize
and address these barriers to give U.S. investors the same op-
portunities in Japan that Japanese investors have in the United
States.
128. Japan-Country Marketing Plan FY'94, supra note 45, pt. V.A.2 (Intel-
lectual Property Section) (stating that "Japan has been on the 'watch list' under
the 'special 301' provisions of the 1988 Trade Act each year since 1989, due to
legal deficiencies and practical problems in patent, copyright, and trademark
protection").
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Japan-Destination Japan, supra note 39.
133. Id. During the four-year period, trademarks are legally unprotected
unless the owner can prove that the trademark is "well-known in Japan and
that consumers will be confused by the use of an identical or similar mark by
the unauthorized user." Id.
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IV. A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE U.S. DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN JAPAN
The severity of the current trade and investment imbal-
ances requires a comprehensive agreement on foreign direct in-
vestment. Currently, there is no international agreement that
regulates foreign direct investment between the United States
and Japan. The contracting parties of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)134 addressed international invest-
ment in the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
agreement as part of the Uruguay Round.' 35 Unfortunately,
TRIMS does not address foreign direct investment per se. While
the TRIMS agreement prevents governments from imposing
"buy domestic" laws and "imported goods" quotas on foreign di-
rect investors, 136 it does not provide a means to eliminate Japa-
nese barriers to direct investment. American negotiators must
look outside the GATT for a solution.
Apart from the SII and each country's best efforts to deter
anticompetitive practices, there is no bilateral agreement be-
tween Japan and the United States that harmonizes the regula-
tion of anticompetitive practices.1 37 Even if such an enforceable
agreement did exist, harmonizing national differences in compe-
tition policy will not equalize access to Japanese markets be-
cause differences in stock ownership and cross-shareholding will
134. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Apr. 15,
1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT 1994]. The Final Act of the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement) were
signed at the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting in April 1994. The WTO Agree-
ment includes the GATT 1994, which is based on the text of the original GATT
1947 as amended.
135. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, opened for signa-
ture Apr. 15, 1994, in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS at 163, GATI' Sales No. 1994-4
(1994) [hereinafter TRIMS]. TRIMS prohibits investment measures related to
trade in goods which are "inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment
provided for in Article II:4 of the GATT 1994" because they "are mandatory or
enforceable under domestic law or administrative rulings" and require "the
purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any
domestic source." Id. Annex (Illustrative List). TRIMS also prohibits invest-
ment measures which are "inconsistent with the obligation of the general elimi-
nation of quantitative restrictions provided for in Article XI:1 of the GATT
1994" because they restrict "the importation by an enterprise of products used
in or related to its local production." Id.
136. Id.
137. See D'ANDREA TYSON, supra note 27, at 279 (arguing that in the ab-
sence of a bilateral agreement, the United States is forced to rely upon "extra-
territorial application of national anti-trust regulations").
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remain.138 Despite this, it is important that Japan eliminate its
barriers to U.S. direct investment. U.S. negotiators must pro-
vide an incentive for Japanese officials to act.
A. SECTION 301 AND ITS OPERATION
On October 1, 1994, after fifteen months of often bitter
talks, U.S. negotiators obtained Japanese trade concessions in
the areas of telecommunications, medical equipment, insurance
and glass products. 139 To obtain these concessions, U.S. negoti-
ators threatened trade sanctions under the Section 301 trade
provision. 140 Section 301, revived by President Clinton on
March 3, 1994, allows the USTR to threaten sanctions against
Japanese exports unless agreements are reached.' 41 In fact, be-
cause the two countries failed to reach an agreement to increase
Japanese purchases of American cars and car parts, President
Clinton responded with limited trade sanctions. 142 The overall
success of these negotiations shows that a credible threat of
trade retaliation is sometimes necessary to obtain concessions
from Japan.143
The United States can use Section 301 to eliminate foreign
investment barriers as well. Section 301 provides that if the
138. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
139. Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Gains Access To More Markets in Japanese
Deal, N.Y. TIMES., Oct. 2, 1994, § 1, at 1.
140. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988). "Super 301" modifies Section 301 of the 1988
Trade Act. Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1978, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp.
IV 1986). For purposes of this Note, the differences between Super 301 and
Section 301 are negligible. For an explanation of the differences between Super
301 and Section 301, see Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the
1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25
STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988).
141. Trade Expansion Priorities, supra note 66.
142. Friedman, supra note 139, § 1, at 1.
143. One commentator reviewed the effect of Section 301 on trade negotia-
tions, and noted the following: '
By providing leverage in the form of a credible threat of retaliation,
Section 301 has enhanced the ability of the United States to negotiate
and enforce agreements to eliminate unfair trade practices and to gain
access to Japanese markets for U.S. exports. It has become one of the
most effective weapons that the United States has in its negotiating
arsenal to overcome the great reluctance of the Japanese to enter into
trade agreements.
Jean Heilman Grier, The Use of Section 301 to Open Japanese Markets to For-
eign Firms, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 2 (1992). See also THoMAS 0.
BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE
POLIcY 34-35 (1994) (noting the argument that "Japan should be compelled to
show results-to either import more US goods or face certain retaliation").
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USTR determines that an "act, policy or practice" 1' of a foreign
country "is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States
commerce," 145 action shall be taken "to obtain the elimination of
that act, policy, or practice." 46 Under this authority, the Presi-
dent can authorize the USTR to impose trade sanctions until Ja-
pan eliminates foreign direct investment barriers. Section 301
authorizes the USTR to "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the ap-
plication of, benefits of trade agreement concessions" 147 or
"impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of...
and fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country
for such time as the Trade Representative determines
appropriate." 148
B. POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE USE OF SECTION 301
Imposing sanctions against Japan could be costly. Section
301 sanctions may violate the GATT. 149 If the United States re-
taliates with sanctions against Japan, Article XXIII provides
that the contracting parties may authorize Japan to suspend
concessions made to the United States. 150 Despite these risks,
144. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B) (1988). Section 2411(d), entitled "Definitions
and special rules," states that for purposes of this subchapter:
(3)(B) Acts, policies, and practices that are unreasonable include, but
are not limited to, any act, policy, or practice, or any combination of
acts, policies, or practices, which-
(i) denies fair and equitable-
(I) opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise,
(II) provision of adequate and effective protection of intel-
lectual property rights, or
(III) market opportunities, including the toleration by a for-
eign government of systematic anti-competitive activities by
private firms or among private firms in the foreign country
that have the effect of restricting, on a basis that is inconsis-
tent with commercial considerations, access by United States
goods to purchasing by such firms.
145. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1XB)(ii) (1988). For purposes of this subchapter,
the term "commerce" includes, but is not limited to, "foreign direct investment
by United States persons with implications for trade in goods or services." 19
U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1)(B) (1988).
146. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2) (1988).
147. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1) (1988).
148. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(B) (1988).
149. BAYARD & ELLIOT, supra note 143, at 71-72 (identifying incidents when
Section 301 retaliation violated U.S. GATT obligations).
150. Article XXIII, entitled "Nullification or Impairment," states in relevant
part, that if "any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to
it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired,"
and if "the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are seri-
ous enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or
parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of
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the United States must be willing to bear the cost of GATT viola-
tions for the use of Section 301 trade sanctions.
Idle threats of trade sanctions provide no incentive for coun-
tries to take Section 301 negotiations seriously.' 5 ' For example,
since 1988, the USTR has initiated Section 301 action for foreign
direct investment violations against India 5 2 and South Ko-
rea. 153 In response, India agreed to "consider easing some limits
on foreign investment,"15 4 and South Korea, although formally
agreeing to lower its investment barriers, ignored Section 301
threats.'5 5 It is apparent from these two cases that the mere
threat of sanctions under Section 301 failed to increase U.S. di-
rect investment in India and South Korea. Had the United
States proceeded to impose sanctions, however, it is likely that
Section 301 would have achieved very different results.
In theory, the potential negative results from the use of Sec-
tion 301 against Japan undermine its intended purpose. First,
Japan may stop responding to highly publicized threats under
the provision as Section 301 may violate the GATT.15 6 Second,
Section 301 commits the President to deadlines that could seri-
ously compromise his ability to conduct negotiations with Japan
in other areas.'5 7 Third, GATT violations erode U.S. credibility
such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement." GATT 1994,
supra note 134, art. XXIII(1), (2).
151. BAYARD & ELLIOT, supra note 143, at 321 (arguing that if the United
States refuses to move forward with sanctions, Section 301 will lose its credibil-
ity among U.S. trading partners).
152. Id. at 164-70.
153. Id. at 177-81.
154. Id. at 169.
155. Id. at 180.
156. Id. at 320. During recent trade negotiations between the two countries,
Japan refused to accept quantitative targets for measuring progress under
trade agreements. In February 1994, after the breakdown of the U.S.-Japan
framework negotiations, Yoshihiro Sakamoto, director-general of MITI, warned
that "if the US were to impose sanctions against Japan, and its action [sic] were
found to be in breach of Gatt rules, Japan could retaliate against the US."
Michiyo Nakamoto, Japan Warns U.S. It May Retaliate, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1994, at 4.
157. BAYARD & ELLIOT, supra note 143, at 321.
The super 301 deadline can put the president in the undesirable posi-
tion of having to decide whether to designate a priority unfair trading
country or practice precisely when he is negotiating with that country
on other US priorities. One can easily imagine a super 301 deadline
falling in the midst of delicate negotiations ... with Japan on aid to the
former Soviet Union, with both Japan and South Korea on sanctions
against North Korea ....
Id. at 321-22.
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in multilateral and regional trade negotiations.15 8 Finally, Sec-
tion 301 action and Japanese retaliation would further strain
our economic and diplomatic relations. As trade experts point
out, the United States and Japan are more than just economi-
cally interdependent.159 Maintaining favorable diplomatic rela-
tions with Japan is a crucial part of U.S. foreign policy.
C. STRATEGIES To INCREASE U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
JAPAN AND LOWER THE TRADE DEFICIT WITH JAPAN
An alternative to Section 301 is to continue negotiating with
the Japanese government toward a bilateral investment agree-
ment. By May 1995, as part of the U.S.-Japan framework talks,
negotiators are scheduled to successfully conclude four "rounds"
of talks with an agreement aimed at increasing U.S. direct in-
vestment in Japan. 160 The potential agreement provides more
financial assistance to U.S. investors through the Japanese De-
velopment Bank, enacts labor policy reform (so Japanese em-
ployees of U.S. companies would not lose their pensions when
taking a new job with a Japanese employer), increases the defi-
cit carry-over period from ten to fifteen years, and promotes
U.S.-Japanese industry-to-industry contacts. 161
While the proposed framework agreement would be a posi-
tive accomplishment, it covers nothing new. Japanese negotia-
tors will, once again, agree that foreign direct investment is a
"good thing." Both sides will agree to work together to increase
levels of U.S. direct investment in Japan. And once again, both
sides will fail to address the institutionalized barriers that cre-
ated the investment gap. Ideally, a bilateral investment agree-
ment will harmonize U.S.-Japanese investment regulations,
antimonopoly laws, corporate tax policies and intellectual prop-
erty procedures. Because the U.S.-Japan framework talks have
not addressed some of these fundamental issues, the benefits de-
rived from the talks will be limited.
158. Id. at 322. The authors state that "Super 301 is universally reviled by
US trading partners, who associate it with the worst excesses of US aggressive
unilateralism: that is, the labeling of countries as unfair traders and of specific
practices as unreasonable when there is no violation of international rules or
agreements." Id.
159. Indeed, maintaining friendly U.S.-Japan relations is important because
the countries are politically interdependent. For example, from a security
standpoint, Japan depends on the presence of American security forces in
Southeast Asia. In turn, we depend on Japanese financial assistance for mili-
tary action (e.g., the Gulf War).
160. USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing Topic, supra note 40.
161. Id.
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Although the use of Section 301 is precarious, it is impor-
tant to point out that the United States has imposed these sanc-
tions against Japan only twice, 162 and that the "real force
behind Section 301 that provides the United States with negoti-
ating leverage is not the actual imposition of sanctions, but the
threat of such sanctions."163 Also, because the United States did
not conduct the U.S.-Japan Framework talks under Section 301,
there is no threat of sanctions should the negotiations fail, and it
will be difficult to monitor and enforce whatever agreement the
two sides reach. Congress explicitly armed Section 301 with
several monitoring requirements to "bolster the enforcement" of
agreements. 64 Under Section 301, if the Administration deter-
mines that an agreement is not being met, "action under Section
301 would be expected to provide Japan with the necessary im-
petus to fulfill its commitments." 165
Section 301 can only be used to monitor and enforce agree-
ments negotiated under Section 301.166 Because the framework
talks are not being conducted under Section 301, it will be diffi-
cult to enforce the resulting agreement in any significant way.
Thus, while there is a question about whether the Japanese are
agreeing to anything significant in the framework talks, there is
also a question about whether they will bother adhering to the
agreement.
Finally, the most effective way to reduce the U.S. invest-
ment and trade deficits with Japan is to conclude the framework
talks, and expand the resulting agreement through continued
negotiation. These further negotiations should be conducted
under Section 301, and the United States should then use the
provision to monitor and enforce any resulting Japanese
concessions.
CONCLUSION
Currently a large gap exists in the direct investment levels
between the United States and Japan. These levels directly af-
fect the balance of trade between the two countries. To help re-
162. The United States has imposed Section 301 sanctions against Japan
once with regard to semiconductors, and once involving leather and leather
footwear. Grier, supra note 143, at 38, 39 n.236.
163. Id. at 39.
164. Id. at 37. "[It seems clear that a primary use of Section 301 for the
foreseeable future will be to ensure that Japan fulfills its obligations under
newly-negotiated trade agreements." Id. at 36.
165. Id. at 37.
166. Id.
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duce the U.S.-Japan trade deficit, the United States should
make efforts to increase its level of direct investment in Japan.
Historically, Japan has discriminated against foreign direct in-
vestment by creating and permitting the existence of formal and
informal barriers to foreign direct investment. While it has re-
cently attempted to lure foreign direct investment, Japanese
programs do not compensate for the barriers that initially cre-
ated the investment gap.
The Japanese barriers most responsible for the investment
gap with the United States are official government regulations,
unfair keiretsu business practices, lax enforcement of the An-
timonopoly Law, and inefficient intellectual property procedures
for foreign direct investors. To effectively reduce the investment
gap, Japan should repeal the laws and regulations that discour-
age U.S. direct investment, strengthen and more fully enforce
the Antimonopoly Law, improve its intellectual property proce-
dures, and expand government programs designed to lure for-
eign direct investors.
To encourage the Japanese government to implement these
reforms, the United States could threaten trade sanctions
against Japanese products with Section 301. Some argue that
Japanese officials will not make substantial investment conces-
sions without facing the threat of U.S. trade sanctions. On the
other hand, others argue that action under Section 301 is unpre-
dictable, GATT illegal, and could result in retaliatory Japanese
measures.
In spite of these contingencies, the United States should use
Section 301 to arrive at a binding bilateral agreement with Ja-
pan on foreign direct investment. Upon completion of such an
agreement, the United States should further use Section 301 to
assess, monitor, and enforce the resulting Japanese concessions.
Only when U.S. direct investment in Japan increases will the
U.S. trade and investment deficits decrease. Furthermore, only
when the fundamental Japanese barriers to U.S. direct invest-
ment are lowered will U.S. investors enjoy the same kind of op-
portunity Japanese investors enjoy in the United States.
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